The Philadelphi Corridor + New Episode on a Palestinian State, Part 1
A tiny strip of sand is about to become hugely controversial
You’re going to start hearing a lot more about the Philadelphi Corridor. No, not the Amtrak line between New York and DC (though worthy, no doubt, of its own blog). This Philadelphi Corridor is an 8-mile long, couple hundred feet-wide, strip of sand in between Egypt and Gaza, and Israel is looking to take it over. Again.
Let’s back up. Egypt seized Gaza in the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, and occupied the territory up until 1967. During the Six Day War that year, Israel captured Gaza as well as the Sinai Peninsula (which fully belonged to Egypt). In 1979 Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from Sinai; but Israel would hang on to Gaza. The line separating Egyptian Sinai from Israel-occupied Gaza split the town of Rafah in two halves. The Philadelphi Corridor radiated along the border line from Rafah, providing a few hundred feet of buffer zone to prevent weapons from being brought into Gaza from Egypt. But it was also very dangerous. Its narrowness made it easy to attack the Israeli soldiers patrolling the Corridor.
Why “Philadelphi”? No reason. The name was a randomly chosen code word by the IDF. But here’s a fun fact: Philadelphia, meaning “brotherly love,” was the original Greek name of what is today Amman, the capital of Jordan.
Fast forward to 2005. Israel ended its occupation of Gaza, removing all the Jewish residents and IDF forces from the Strip. Gaza wasn’t given back to Egypt but turned into a Palestinian-controlled enclave. But what to do about the Philadelphi Corridor? The Corridor was key to controlling weapons smuggling and Israel worried that giving up control of the Corridor was a huge security risk (spoiler alert: they were right). But withdrawing from Gaza meant full withdrawal. The IDF worried that in the absence of IDF forces elsewhere in Gaza, soldiers in the Corridor would be even more vulnerable to Palestinian attacks. So the IDF left. But Egypt, too, wasn’t looking to see Gaza militarized, and continued patrolling their side of the Corridor.
A border crossing opened between Egypt and Gaza in Rafah, under the control of Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, and observed by the EU, all in agreement with Israel. The intention was to manage the flow of people and goods, while the Philadelphi Corridor, now manned by Egyptian forces, continued to provide the buffer zone against the militarization of Gaza. But then came Hamas.
When Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, Egypt and Israel closed their respective borders with the Strip. Hamas then dug tunnels to to get around, er, under, the Philadelphi Corridor. These were used for smuggling — everything from food to fuel to animals and, of course, weapons. Lots and lots of weapons. Thousands of tunnels were constructed to crisscross under the border with Egypt.
Because Egypt now controlled the Philadelphi Corridor, it was their job to destroy those tunnels, which they did, often brutally. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of Palestinians were killed over the years, as Egypt bombed, flooded, and even dumped poison gas into the tunnels to destroy them. Several dozen Egyptian soldiers were also killed by Palestinian terrorists coming into Egypt. Egypt destroyed lots of tunnels, but not enough of them. Hamas still made use of the network to import weapons.
Now, in the post-October 7 environment, Israel is working out how to maintain a much more active defensive profile along the Gaza borders. Once again we have the question of what to do about the Philadelphi Corridor. Netanyahu declared that Israel will retake control over the Corridor as part of the postwar security arrangements. This would mean that, once again, a thin line of Israeli forces would come in between Egypt and Gaza. Gaza will for the first time since 2005, be completely surrounded by Israel.
The Israeli journalist Yoni Ben Menachem writes, “The corridor’s control translates to dominance over the Rafah crossing, the sole border crossing linking the Gaza Strip to the Arab world and crucial for the international travel of senior Hamas officials.”
Egypt is opposed to this — it argues that the smuggling tunnels were destroyed years ago and thus the IDF’s control over Philadelphi unnecessary. But Israeli intelligence strongly suggests this isn’t the case, and accuses Egypt of having fallen short of its patrolling obligations in recent years. If push comes to shove, Egypt is likely to acquiesce to Israel’s demands.
The Philadelphi Corridor, then, is one element of a new security arrangement for Gaza. Israel insists on maintaining overall security control without governing Gaza directly. Besides the Corridor, Israel wants to establish a 1-km deep buffer zone inside Gaza, a large no-go zone to prevent anyone from getting close to Israel’s border fence — either above or below ground. Israel is also planning to double its military forces along the border. Rather than a passive defense (sitting on their side of the border waiting for something to happen), Israel wants a more active defense, in which the army will conduct targeted raids into Gaza to deal with weapons and other threats. And rather than look the other way when tunnels are built, Israel will aggressively destroy them as soon as they are discovered. After October 7, there is no appetite for half-measures.
But of course the war is not over. At the moment it’s in something of a stalemate. Israeli forces are poised around Rafah, Hamas’ last holdout and thought to be where most of the hostages are located, along with more than a million Palestinian civilians. But so far the IDF isn’t going in (the sign to watch for is calling up the reservists who were sent home).
Hamas is continuing its obstinacy, refusing to negotiate a cease-fire, release the hostages, or even to release any information about the hostages. Hamas’ leader, Yahya Sinwar, is calculating that the continued despair in Gaza will compel Israel’s allies to force Israel to end the war without Hamas having to give up a thing. Israel is betting that increasing the flow of humanitarian aid into northern Gaza will buy them the time and goodwill to ultimately invade Rafah to finish off Hamas.
So the postwar scenario is probably still a long ways off. But when we get there, keep an eye on the Philadelphi Corridor. Whoever controls it will control a great deal in Gaza.
This Week’s Episode: Getting to a Palestinian State, Part 1
If a Palestinian state is the ultimate goal, then Israel, the Palestinians, and the international community are all going to have to do things they really don’t want to do. Today we’re looking at this from Israel’s angle, with the focus on security.
Find the podcast episode here, or wherever you listen to podcasts.
Find the written transcript below:
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Picture of the Day
A priest prays at an altar in Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre. In the 4th century CE, Emperor Constantine’s mother, Helena, came to Jerusalem in search of relics and sites associated with Jesus Christ. Today’s Church marks the place where Helena was told Jesus was crucified and then buried. An empty tomb said to be his is partially preserved inside. Six Christian denominations share (and argue over) control over the Church complex, a system known as the Status Quo.
Photo: Jason Harris